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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
                                          
 
                           No. 00-4116 
                                          
 
 
                          ROBERT BRESKO, 
                                   Appellant 
 
                                v. 
 
       ROBERT JOHN, Detective, Shamokin Police Department; 
   ANTHONY J. ROSINI, District Attorney, Northumberland County 
 
                                          
 
                           No. 00-4251 
                                          
 
 
                          ROBERT BRESKO, 
                                   Appellant 
 
                                v. 
 
       ROBERT JOHN, Detective, Shamokin Police Department; 
            DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY 
                                          
 
         On Appeal from the United States District Court 
             for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
                   (D.C. Civil No. 00-cv-01472) 
           District Judge:  Hon. James F. McClure, Jr. 
                                        
            Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                         February 4, 2002 
 
          Before:  SLOVITER, AMBRO, Circuit Judges, POLLAK, District Judge 
                                  
                     (Filed  March 12, 2002) 
                                          
 
 
                         OPINION OF COURT 
 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
     Appellant Robert Bresko was charged in a Pennsylvania state court 
with ten 
violations of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code arising from the alleged rape 
of Desiree 
Burns, the woman with whom he cohabited.  Based on information provided by 
Burns to 
Detective Robert John of the Shamokin Police Department, Detective John 
filed a 
probable cause affidavit and a criminal complaint in the District Justice 
Court of 
Northumberland County, which the District Justice reviewed and approved, 
issuing a 
warrant for Bresko's arrest.  On March 28, 1999, John arrested Bresko 
pursuant to the 
warrant. 
     Shortly after Bresko's arrest, John contacted Officer Charles Pensyl 
of the Coal 
Township Police Department and informed him of Bresko's arrest.  John, who 
was aware 
of the police investigation into the murder of Matthew Hoy and apparently 
believed that 
Bresko might have relevant information, told Pensyl that the charges that 
gave rise to 
Bresko's arrest were going to "go away" and a deal could be made for 
Bresko's 
cooperation in the Hoy murder investigation.  The next day, John told 
Bresko that if he 
contacted Pensyl, John would do something about the charges pending 
against him. 
     Pensyl contacted Bresko's attorney and advised him that the charges 
against 
Bresko would "go away" if Bresko provided information to the police about 
the pending 
Hoy murder investigation.  Bresko agreed to assist Pensyl in exchange for 
the withdrawal 
of charges against him.  Thereafter, on April 15, 1999, John and Pensyl 
met with Bresko 
and his attorney and they orally agreed to a Cooperation Agreement whereby 
Bresko 
would cooperate with the murder investigation in exchange for the 
withdrawal of the 
charges against him arising from the alleged rape of Burns.  In accordance 
with this 
Cooperation Agreement, Bresko made a several-hour statement that provided 
the Coal 
Township police with information needed to pursue a specific suspect in 
the murder 
investigation. 
     On May 11, 1999, William Cole, an Assistant District Attorney for 
Northumberland County, negotiated an agreement with Bresko and his 
attorney based on 
the Cooperation Agreement and Bresko's satisfaction of its terms.  Under 
the terms of 
that agreement, Bresko would plead guilty to certain unrelated charges and 
he would 
waive the preliminary hearings for both these unrelated charges and those 
arising from 
the alleged rape.  In return, the District Attorney would, inter alia, 
recommend to the 
sentencing judge that Bresko be given no additional prison time and that 
no parole 
violation would be issued against Bresko.  Pennsylvania's courts have 
interpreted 
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 590 to mean that "no plea 
agreement exists 
unless and until it is presented to the court."  Commonwealth v. McElroy, 
665 A.2d 813, 
816 (Pa. Super. 1995); see also Commonwealth v. Spence, 627 A.2d 1176, 
1184 (Pa. 
1993).  The agreement between Bresko and the District Attorney's office 
was not 
reduced to writing nor was it presented to the court. 
     Later that month, in the presence of John, Pensyl, and Bresko's 
attorney, Cole 
asked the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County to release Bresko 
based on 
the Cooperation Agreement between John and Bresko and Bresko's cooperation 
in the 
murder investigation.  Thereafter, the court released Bresko from custody 
and placed him 
under house arrest. 
     In January 2000, Anthony Rosini, the District Attorney of 
Northumberland 
County, informed Bresko's attorney that he would not honor the terms of 
the 
Cooperation Agreement and that he would continue to prosecute Bresko for 
the charges 
arising from the alleged rape of Burns.  Bresko then filed a complaint 
against John and 
Rosini in the federal court under 42 U.S.C.  1983. 
     Bresko's complaint alleged that John deprived him of his Fourth 
Amendment 
right to be free from unlawful arrest and seizure (1) by arresting Bresko 
without a 
reasonable good faith belief that he committed the crimes at issue and (2) 
by providing 
false and misleading information in the criminal complaint, in the 
Affidavit of Probable 
Cause, and to the District Attorney.  Bresko sought, inter alia, an 
undetermined amount 
of damages, costs, and attorney fees. 
     Bresko's complaint also alleged that Rosini deprived Bresko of due 
process under 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by initiating and continuing a 
prosecution of 
Bresko despite the existence of the Cooperation Agreement and without a 
reasonable 
expectation of obtaining a valid conviction.  Bresko sought, inter alia, 
an order 
compelling Rosini to honor the Cooperation Agreement and an injunction 
prohibiting 
him from prosecuting Bresko for crimes arising from the alleged rape.  
Both John and 
Rosini filed motions to dismiss, which the District Court granted on 
November 7, 2000. 
     The District Court dismissed the action against Rosini under the 
abstention 
doctrine enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which 
requires that a 
federal court should generally abstain from enjoining pending state 
criminal proceedings.  
The District Court dismissed the action against John on the ground that it 
was not ripe for 
adjudication.  The court held that under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 
(1994),  a  
1983 plaintiff who alleges a "harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness 
would render a 
conviction or sentence invalid," id. at 486, can recover damages only if 
the conviction or 
sentence has been reversed or called into question in some way.  Bresko 
appeals the 
District Court's order dismissing his complaint. 
     Shortly after the District Court's order, Bresko filed an Omnibus 
Pretrial Motion 
in the Northumberland County Court of Common Pleas, where the criminal 
charges were 
pending, claiming that his arrest was unconstitutional and that his 
prosecution violated 
his constitutional right to fundamental fairness because it was contrary 
to the 
Cooperation Agreement.  The state court rejected those contentions, based 
in part upon 
the requirements of Pennsylvania law that plea agreements be in writing.  
The court 
subsequently refused to certify the issue for appeal, and the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court 
dismissed Bresko's attempt at appellate review. 
     After all the parties before us in this appeal submitted briefs on 
the issues raised 
by the dismissal, Assistant District Attorney Michael Toomey, with 
Rosini's authority, 
entered into a letter agreement with Bresko dated November 15, 2001 in 
which the 
District Attorney agreed to nol pros all of the original charges against 
Bresko in 
exchange for Bresko's pleading nolo contendere to two amended 
informations, one 
charging a simple assault and the other charging a simple assault by 
physical menance.  
Both charges are misdemeanors of the second degree.  Pursuant to the 
written plea 
agreement, on November 19, 2001, Rosini filed both the nol pros motion of 
the original 
charges and the amended informations, to which Bresko pled nolo 
contendere.  In light 
of this change in the underlying circumstances, we allowed the parties to 
submit 
supplemental briefs. 
              JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
     The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1331 and 
1343(a)(3) 
and (a)(4) over Bresko's claim against John and pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
1343(a)(4) and 
42 U.S.C.  1983 over Bresko's claim against Rosini.  This court has 
appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1291. 
     This court conducts a plenary review of a district court's decision 
to grant a 
motion to dismiss.  City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 
262 n.12 (3d 
Cir. 1998).  For purposes of a motion to dismiss, this court accepts as 
true the allegations 
of the non-moving party and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences 
drawn from allegations contained in the record.  Id. 
                           DISCUSSION 
A. Complaint against Rosini 
     In reviewing the District Court's dismissal of the complaint against 
Rosini, we 
must determine whether the following three requirements for Younger 
abstention were 
established:  
                    (1) there must be an ongoing state judicial proceeding 
to 
          which the federal plaintiff is a party and with which the 
          federal proceeding will interfere, (2) the state proceedings 
          must implicate important state interests, and (3) the state 
          proceedings must afford an adequate opportunity to raise the 
          constitutional claims.  
 
FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 843 (3d Cir. 
1996).  
In addition, we have stated that "[e]ven if these three elements are 
satisfied, abstention is 
not appropriate where the federal claimant makes a showing of bad faith, 
harassment, or 
some other extraordinary circumstance."  O'Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 
32 F.3d 785, 
789 n.11 (3d Cir. 1994).  Bresko has argued that all three exceptions to 
Younger 
abstention are applicable here. 
     It appears that the District Court's holding that Younger abstention 
required 
dismissal of Bresko's complaint against Rosini was not unreasonable in 
light of the then- 
ongoing state criminal proceedings against Bresko, proceedings in which 
Bresko could 
have raised his constitutional claims.  Now that those criminal 
proceedings have 
terminated, abstention is no longer appropriate.  We therefore will remand 
Bresko's 
complaint against Rossini to the District Court. 
B. Complaint against John 
     The District Court dismissed Bresko's claim against Detective John on 
the ground 
that, under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), Bresko's  1983 claim 
against John 
was not ripe because the criminal proceedings against him had not 
terminated in his 
favor.  On appeal, Bresko argues that his claim against John is for false 
arrest and Heck 
is therefore inapplicable because, as we have stated, "a claim of unlawful 
arrest, standing 
alone, does not necessarily implicate the validity of a criminal 
prosecution following the 
arrest."  Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 n.5 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(quotation and 
citation omitted).  In other words, Bresko argues that he can seek to 
recover damages for 
false arrest regardless of the outcome of the state criminal proceedings 
against him.  We 
do not here address the merits of this argument.  On remand, the District 
Court shall 
consider this argument if Bresko continues to press it. 
     John argues in his supplemental brief that Bresko's nolo contendere 
pleas to the 
amended informations, which charged facts underlying the arrest on the 
original criminal 
charges, collaterally estop Bresko from challenging the lawfulness of his 
arrest.  He also 
argues that the state court's decision on Bresko's Omnibus Pretrial Motion 
acts to 
collaterally estop Bresko's claim.  The state court denied Bresko's motion 
to vacate his 
arrest, finding that John had probable cause to arrest Bresko.  This 
decision was based on 
testimony from John and Cole, the Assistant District Attorney involved in 
the negotiation 
of the Plea Agreement and the arguments of both parties.  Bresko responds 
that under 
Pennsylvania law a plea of nolo contendere cannot be used as an admission 
in any civil 
suit, including the pending  1983 action, and that application of 
collateral estoppel 
would not be appropriate in these circumstances. 
     The District Court did not reach these issues arising from Bresko's 
complaint 
against John because it dismissed the case before the termination of the 
criminal 
proceedings.  That court did not have the opportunity to consider the 
parties' arguments 
in light of the changed circumstances, and it is unclear whether there are 
material factual 
issues to be resolved.  Now that the criminal proceedings against Bresko 
have 
terminated, among the relevant questions to be considered are whether Heck 
applies and, 
if so, whether the proceedings have terminated in Bresko's favor.  We will 
therefore 
remand Bresko's complaint against John to the District Court. 
                           CONCLUSION 
     In light of the conclusion of the state court criminal proceedings 
against Bresko, 
the circumstances of this case have changed.  Therefore, we will vacate 
the District 
Court's dismissal of Bresko's claims against Rosini and John, and will 
remand this case 
to the District Court for further proceedings. 
___________________                                
 
TO THE CLERK: 
 




                    _/S/ Dolores K. Sloviter_________________________ 
                           Circuit Judge 
